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I.  Introduction 
 
Like other Latin American countries, Bolivia has included privatization in a 
package of structural reforms that, over the last 15 years, have significantly liberalized its 
economy.  As elsewhere, utilities have been among the key enterprises transferred to the 
private sector, in an effort to attract investment and increase efficiency. 
As Estache et al. (2000) review, increasing interest centers on how such transfers 
affected lower income households’ access to basic services, and their welfare more 
generally.  While this has not yet been a major concern in Bolivia, the economic 
slowdown of the past two years has resulted in growing criticism of the entire 
liberalization process, and further information on the “social” impact of privatization 
might usefully inform ongoing policy discussions. 
In this context, this paper describes the privatization process as it took place in 
Bolivia, placing emphasis on the particularities of the “capitalization” mechanism that 
was used for this purpose, and the regulatory framework that was introduced as its 
complement.  With this background, the document then analyzes the impact of reforms 
on poor or lower income households along two dimensions:  i) access, understood as 
connection, and ii) affordability, as determined by changes in consumption and pricing 
patterns.  Due to data availability issues, the emphasis is on urban households, though 
information on the rural area is included where feasible. 
 The general picture that emerges points to the following conclusions: 
1) Capitalization and regulation, and the liberalization of the utilities sector more 
generally, have been effective as far as attracting foreign investment, thereby fulfilling 
one of these reforms’ central macroeconomic goals. 
2) Overall, the evidence suggests that this investment facilitated an expansion of access to 
basic services in the urban area.  Access rates in the rural area, however, remain at very 
low levels, which partially reflects that privatization was rarely meant to affect service 
provision in this realm. 
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3) In the urban area and in terms of connection, the service expansions observed have not 
bypassed the poor.  On the contrary, in many cases it is the lower income quintiles that 
seem to have benefited the most. 
4) The fact that these reforms had a much smaller effect in rural areas, however, implies 
that if one focuses on the poor at a national level, these expansions have probably 
benefited higher income groups to a greater extent. 
5) As far as the effects of pricing changes on households’ welfare, the information 
presented does suggest some adverse effects.  Nevertheless, the findings in this area are 
affected by data limitations, and in any case would not seem to outweigh the benefits 
brought about by greater access. 
While this is a relatively optimistic prognosis as to the effects of capitalization 
and regulation, it seems to be consistent with the fact that while increasing criticism is 
aimed at economic liberalization within Bolivia, it is rarely focused on the direct 
consequences of utility sector reform on the poor, except maybe for some localized 
exceptions in the water sector. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section provides 
general background on economic performance and poverty in Bolivia.  Section III 
describes the privatization process of the mid-1990’s, and section IV explores its impact 
on access and affordability, paying particular attention to poor households’ situation.  
Section V explores changes in consumer welfare, and section VI reviews macroeconomic 
effects.  Section VII discusses challenges facing the regulatory system, and section VIII 
concludes. 
 
II. General background:  a simple characterization of poverty 
 
After a severe crisis that began in the late 1970’s, Bolivia implemented substantial 
economic liberalization measures in 1985, ending hyperinflation and setting the basis for 
moderate but sustained growth.  Figure 1, which presents basic information on inflation 
and economic growth during this period, illustrates this development. 
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Given an annual population growth rate of about 2.3 percent, the observed 
economic growth rates would not be expected to make a major dent on poverty.  Table 1 
illustrates this point presenting basic information on its level and evolution.
2
  As the table 
shows, the incidence of poverty is significantly greater in urban centers outside the 
department capitals, and in the rural area, where in 1999 it is estimated at roughly 80 
percent. 
 
Table 1 
Headcount and poverty gap measures in urban Bolivia 
 
Headcount measure 
(% of hhlds. Poor) 
1989 1993 1997 1999 
National -- -- 63.2 62.7 
Departmental capitals 52.9 52.0 50.7 47.0 
Other urban areas -- -- 63.7 65.8 
Rural areas -- -- 77.3 81.7 
Note:  Urquiola (1994) is the source for the 1989 figure, and The World Bank (2000) for the rest. 
           For definitions on the measures used, see either of these publications. 
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 For an early assessment of how growth and changes in the income distribution affected poverty, see 
Urquiola (1994).  For an update using more recent methodologies, see Hernany (2000). 
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In department capitals, where more historical evidence is available, poverty has 
experienced a moderate but sustained decline since 1989.
3
 
Table 2 complements this information presenting the simple probabilities of being 
poor that are associated with given characteristics in each of the realms considered.  
Table 2 
Probability of being poor or extremely poor by group, 1999 
 
 Department capitals Other urban Rural 
Poverty Extreme 
poverty 
Poverty Extreme 
poverty 
Poverty Extreme 
poverty 
Years of schooling:       
None 60.9 27.4 75.6 44.0 92.1 80.3 
1-5 56.0 27.2 78.7 40.8 86.4 74.3 
6-8 55.5 23.1 70.2 37.3 76.6 61.7 
9-12 43.2 18.1 65.2 30.7 65.5 47.1 
More than 12 19.5 6.7 27.0 7.7 25.9 10.6 
Sex:       
Male 45.9 19.7 70.5 37.7 80.9 57.6 
Female 47.4 21.6 72.4 36.2 82.5 60.0 
Ethnicity:       
Non-indigenous 44.8 19.3 72.5 34.9 80.9 56.8 
Indigenous 50.6 23.6 69.8 40.5 82.5 60.7 
Migration:       
Non-migrant since birth 45.0 19.8 72.1 36.4 85.2 63.9 
Migrant since birth 44.8 19.1 66.1 33.6 69.8 41.9 
Non-Migrant in last 5 years 45.2 20.1 68.1 34.0 81.9 58.9 
Migrant in last 5 years 42.5 13.8 79.1 44.5 65.9 38.6 
Employment:       
Employed 39.9 16.1 62.0 28.8 80.2 57.2 
Not in labor force 45.8 20.7 71.5 36.7 77.0 50.3 
Unemployed 50.3 23.9 76.9 47.3 41.4 34.5 
Type of employment:       
Worker Blue collar 53.3 11.6 73.6 31.8 71.5 42.1 
EmployeeWhile collar 28.3 8.9 49.7 17.4 40.2 18.8 
Self-employed 47.0 22.3 61.8 29.4 78.5 54.5 
Employer 21.3 7.9 60.3 24.6 51.5 20.7 
Unpaid family work 57.5 34.1 74.7 45.2 88.1 67.3 
Domestic worker 30.2 6.4 66.7 27.6 36.0 16.3 
Informal 50.4 23.6 73.9 39.5 83.3 60.6 
Formal 32.5 9.3 58.1 22.6 57.4 30.7 
Source:  The World Bank (2000). 
 
These cover aspects like schooling, sex, ethnicity, migration, and employment-related 
characteristics.  The results observed are based on cross sectional variation in individuals’ 
traits and their poverty status, so it is inappropriate to interpret them in a causal manner.  
                                                 
3
 As evident in figure 1, the regional slowdown induced by the Brazilian crisis was already underway in 
Bolivia by 1999.  This may have reversed some of the poverty reductions observed in table 1. 
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Nevertheless, the information is illustrative as to the characteristics that are associated 
with being poor, and the expected ones stand out:  low education, being female, 
indigenous, or participating in the labor market’s “informal” segment. 
After describing the essential features of the privatization process, the remaining 
sections focus on its effects on the poor.  For this purpose, the analysis distinguishes 
between households according to which income quintile they belong to.  While this 
provides for a richer analysis than simpler poor/non-poor distinctions, it is useful to bear 
in mind that as the previous tables suggest, in urban areas, poor households will generally 
be those in the bottom two or three quintiles. 
 
III.  Capitalization, and regulatory reform 
 
Despite the relatively early success with liberalization illustrated in figure 1, 
Bolivia did not engage in sustained privatization efforts until the mid-1990’s.  When it 
finally embarked on this process, the government employed traditional procedures in 
some instances, but mainly relied on capitalization as a mechanism for the transfer of 
State-owned firms.  This section describes how these approaches differ, provides 
information on the legal framework that underpinned their implementation, and briefly 
details the specific changes that took place in the Electricity, Natural Gas, 
Telecommunications, and Water and Sewerage industries. 
 
A. Capitalization and privatization
4
 
 
Under traditional privatization, the government transfers a majority of ownership 
in a State firm to the private sector, and has freedom over how to spend the proceeds.  
Under capitalization, the State transfers shares equivalent to 50 percent of a firm to the 
investor with the winning bid.  It also yields about 45 percent to private pension fund 
administrators, so that the citizenry in general gains this portion,
5
 with the remaining 
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 For more on the capitalization experience, see Baldivia (1998) and Pierce (1997). 
5
 As this step suggests, a reform to the pensions system accompanied capitalization in Bolivia.  The 
pensions fund administrators use the funds derived from this share to pay old-age benefits that complement 
those stemming from individual retirement accounts. 
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going to the company’s employees.  The investor gains the right to manage the firm, and 
commits to investing its capital contribution, the amount it offered for its 50 percent 
share, in its development.  It must carry out this investment within a specified period 
(typically six to eight years), agree to fulfill obligations that encompass expansion and 
quality goals, and operate under regulation and other clauses specified in a long term 
contract (typically 40 years). 
Under this scheme, therefore, investment is given a high priority, and the 
government gains no disposable income.  This reflects the fact that having come 
relatively late in Bolivia’s liberalization, capitalization was not seen as a means to cover 
deficits, but rather as a way to attract foreign investment and improve management in key 
areas of the economy.  Table 3 presents a summary of the privatization and capitalization 
outcomes, including the firms that were created as a result of both, the financial resources 
they generated, and the investments actually executed. 
As this table illustrates, this process raised significant amounts of capital:  total 
commitments add up to about two billion dollars, roughly equivalent to 30 percent of 
GDP.  As detailed below, capitalization contributed to a significant increase in 
investment.  Additionally, several capitalized firms have exceeded their commitments 
ahead of schedule, while announcing ambitious investment programs for subsequent 
periods. 
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Table 3 
Resources generated by privatization and capitalization 
 
Firms created by the 
reform 
Year Privatization 
value 
(Millions of 
$us) 
Capitalization 
value 
(Millions of 
$us) 
Investment as 
of 06/2000 
(as % of 
commitment) 
Company / 
institution in 
charge of 
investment 
Oil and gas 
Chaco S.A. (3) 
Andina S.A. (4) 
Transredes S.A. (5) 
EBR S.A. (6) 
Oil Tanking S.A. (7) 
 
1997 
1997 
1997 
2000 
2000 
 
 
 
 
102.00 
  12.05 
 
306.66 
264.77 
263.50 
 
100.0 
154.2 
(1)  213.0 
 
Chaco S.A. 
Andina S.A. 
Transredes S.A. 
TGN-Investment 
TGN-Investment 
Electricity 
Corani S.A. (8) 
Guaracachi S.A. (9) 
Valle Hermoso S.A. (10) 
TDE S.A. (11) 
Elfec S.A. (12) 
 
1995 
1995 
1995 
1997 
1995 
 
 
 
 
  39.90 
  50.30 
 
  58.79 
  47.13 
  33.92 
 
  86.6 
139.2 
115.6 
 
Corani S.A. 
Guaracachi S.A. 
Valle Hermoso S.A. 
ENDE Residual 
 
Telecommunications 
ENTEL S.A. (13) 
 
1995 
  
610.00 
 
  76.9 
 
ENTEL S.A. 
Transportation 
LAB S.A. (14) 
FCO S.A. (15) 
FCA S.A. (15) 
 
1997 
1996 
1996 
  
  47.47 
  25.85 
  13.25 
 
(2)  100.0 
160.6 
103.1 
 
LAB S.A. 
FCO S.A. 
FCA S.A. 
Total  204.25     1,671.34   
Source:  Authors’ summary of various documents.  (1) Includes de Cuiabá pipeline; (2) According to the 
Transportation Superintendence; (3) Capitalized by Amoco; (4) Capitalized by YPF-Pérez Compac-Plus 
Petrol; (5) Capitalized by Enron-Shell; (6) Privatized in favor of Petrobras and others; (7) Privatized in 
favor of Oil Tanking; (8) Capitalized by Dominion Energy Inc.; (9) Capitalized by Energy Initiatives 
Inc.; (10) Capitalized by Constellation Energy Inc.; (11) Privatized in favor of Unión Fenosa; (12) 
Privatized in favor of EMEL S.A.; (13) Capitalized by ETI Euro Telecom N.V.; (14) Capitalized by VASP;  
(15) Capitalized by Cruz Blanca. 
 
B.  Capitalization and regulation:  the framework for sectoral reforms
6
 
 
Capitalization was complemented with reforms to different sectors’ industrial 
organization, and with the implementation of a regulatory framework that seeks to 
promote competition and efficiency.  The main tool in this regard was the SIRESE
7
 Law 
(1994), which created a regulatory system for the whole infrastructure sector.  In essence, 
this legislation defines the regulatory institutional structure, including the role of five 
regulatory agencies (Superintendencias) for the Electricity, Telecommunications, 
                                                 
6
 As Table 1 reflects, capitalization has been the more important mechanism in the transfer of State assets, 
so that in the remainder of the paper, this term will be used to refer to privatization as well.  For more on 
regulation and regulatory institutions in Bolivia, see Barja (2000) and SIRESE (2000). 
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Hydrocarbons, Potable Water, and Transportation industries.  Additionally, it sets up an 
overseeing agency responsible for system-wide coordination, appeals and evaluation; and 
introduces market competition as one of the guiding principles in the infrastructure 
sector.  Finally, it specifies procedures for appeals, hearings, and conflict resolution.  
This framework is rounded out by four more specific laws:  Electricity (1994), 
Telecommunications (1995), Hydrocarbons (1996) and Potable Water (2000).  These 
introduce changes in each sector’s industrial organization, and govern aspects related to 
tariff regulation, entry, service quality, and sanctions.  The sectoral regulatory agencies 
created as part of SIRESE administer each law.  The remainder of this section briefly 
describes the central changes this legislation led to in each of the industries cited. 
 
 Electricity 
 
Prior to reform, the electricity industry was divided into the National 
Interconnected System (NIS) and other independent networks, a distinction which 
remains today.  The first covers the largest cities, while the second concentrates on 
secondary urban and rural areas.
8
  This paper focuses on the NIS, where the State-owned 
ENDE
9
 participated in generation, transmission, and part of the distribution of electricity, 
through ELFEC, to the city of Cochabamba.  COBEE
10
, a private company, was active in 
generation and distribution in the cities of La Paz and Oruro.  Other firms operating in 
distribution were, CRE
11
 in Santa Cruz, SEPSA
12
 in Potosí and CESSA
13
 in Sucre.  
Competition existed only between ENDE and COBEE, and was limited to the direct 
provision of electricity to a few mining and industrial businesses. 
                                                                                                                                                 
7
 Sistema de Regulación Sectorial. 
8
 This distinction will be used extensively.  In Bolivia, the main cities are the department capitals.  The 
three largest have populations close to one million and form the so-called central axis:  Cochabamba, La 
Paz/El Alto (El Alto is legally independent, but physically and economically linked to La Paz), and Santa 
Cruz.  Unlike most of its neighbors, therefore, Bolivia does not have a dominant urban center, and has one 
of the lowest urban concentration ratios in the region.  For further discussion, see Urquiola et al. (1999). 
9
 Empresa Nacional de Electricidad. 
10
 Compañía Boliviana de Energía Eléctrica. 
11
 Cooperativa Rural Eléctrica. 
12
 Servicios Eléctricos de Potosí, a municipal company. 
13
 Cooperativa Eléctrica Sucre 
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The Electricity Law vertically separated generation, transmission, and 
distribution.  In generation, it promoted competition by creating the three firms cited in 
table 3:  Corani, Guaracachi and Valle Hermoso, limiting the market share each can have 
to 35 percent of the NIS domestic market capacity.  Exclusive rights were initially 
granted to these companies, but by 1999 entry was liberalized and Synergia, 
Hidroeléctrica Boliviana and Río Eléctrico joined the market. 
In transmission, network operation was passed from ENDE to the private 
Transportadora de Electricidad, without exclusive rights.  Additionally, the Electricity 
Law forbids the participation of transmission firms in purchase or sale activities, and 
establishes open access and tariff regulation. 
Finally, in distribution, firms were established as independent regional 
monopolies subject to tariff regulation and quality control: CRE, privatized ELFEC, 
privatized SEPSA, CESSA (still a cooperative), ELECTROPAZ and ELFEO.  The last 
two resulted from the sale of COBEE’s distribution facilities, with the original company 
remaining only in the generation business.  In this realm, tariff regulation consists of 
several average cost caps with productivity factors, which multiplied by their respective 
units, add to produce total income.  The productivity factors are set using a four-year lag, 
although tariffs are revised every semester to allow passthrough of energy costs changes.  
These reforms, together with the introduction of a coordination office, have created a 
wholesale electricity market that seeks to simulate competitive conditions. 
 
Hydrocarbons 
 
Prior to reform, the hydrocarbons (oil and natural gas) industry was under the 
control of State-owned YPFB
14
, a vertically integrated monopoly involved in all aspects 
of the industry.  Limited private participation took place through joint ventures with this 
company. 
Since then, the priority has been to remove YPFB from production, and promote 
foreign investment to foster a natural gas export industry directed mainly towards 
southern Brazil.  The State intends this industry to support the development of other 
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 Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos. 
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sectors of the economy, and with this goal in mind, reforms and foreign investment have 
been directed towards exploration and infrastructure.  The inauguration of a pipeline to 
Brazil in 1999 made this vision a reality.  As for the domestic market, a general policy of 
private control of all phases up to retail commercialization was adopted. 
To implement these objectives, the Hydrocarbons Law requires that exploration, 
production and commercialization be executed by joint ventures with YPFB, while 
placing few restrictions on the export and import of petroleum products.  Pipeline 
administration for gas and oil was transferred to the capitalized Transredes, without 
exclusive rights.  The administration of other pipelines (poliductos) was entrusted to the 
private Oil Tanking, with the remaining under YPFB operation.  In the area of 
refinement, most of YPFB’s units were transferred to the private Empresa Boliviana de 
Refinación, while the wholesale of petroleum products continues under YPFB. 
In the commercialization process, YPFB’s storage terminals were transferred to 
Oil Tanking as well, but other private firms are also active.  Bottled liquefied gas 
distribution plants are all private, and about 85% of bottled gas plants continue under 
YPFB.  Compressed natural gas service stations are all private, and about 15 percent of 
service stations for liquids continue under the State firm.  Imports of liquids (mainly 
diesel) and lubricants are carried out by private firms. 
Mixed businesses continue to participate in network-based natural gas 
distribution:  SERGAS in Santa Cruz, EMCOGAS in Cochabamba, EMDIGAS in Sucre 
and EMTAGAS in Tarija.  Despite this activity, the network-based natural gas industry is 
still relatively underdeveloped:  by 1999 it included only about 6,000 connections. 
Except for restrictions to vertical integration imposed on firms in gas pipeline 
transportation, the industry structure is flexible and determined by export market needs, 
although mergers and acquisitions are subject to approval.  This has permitted 
PETROBRAS, in association with others, to integrate several of the phases directed to 
the natural gas exports to Brazil, at the same time as this company participates in 
refinement directed to the domestic market.  
As part of the regulatory package, rate of return regulation is applied to pipeline 
transportation, with tariffs set to their 1997 level with a four-year regulatory lag.  In 
natural gas network distribution, tariff regulation has not been implemented thus far.  
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Finally, regulation in this sector does have some particularities, since as opposed to the 
utilities considered in the rest of this paper, the hydrocarbons industry produces a tradable 
for which Bolivia is a price taker.  Under policies dictating that domestic prices reflect 
opportunity costs, international price fluctuations affect the domestic market 
significantly. 
 
Telecommunications 
 
Prior to reforms, the telecommunications industry was divided between ENTEL,
15
 
which covered national and international long distance communication services, 15 
cooperatives with monopolies in fixed local telephone services, and Telecel, a private 
monopoly in the cellular market.  The Telecommunications Law maintains this separation 
until entry is liberalized, at the end of 2001.  Until then, ENTEL and the cooperatives 
retain exclusive rights, but the cellular market was opened to competition by allowing the 
entry of ENTEL-Movil (a division of capitalized ENTEL). 
 Additionally, for the period prior to liberalization, legislation mandates tariff 
regulation for firms that control more than the 60 percent of a given market.  This scheme 
has a similar structure in all areas, establishing an initial price cap for different baskets of 
services, adjusted for inflation and a productivity factor with a three-year lag.  Further, 
the law stipulates requirements concerning expansion, service quality, and technological 
modernization.  These were to be reached by the year 2000, and are detailed in Table 4. 
Finally, the Telecommunications Law also features incentives for the exploitation 
of scope economies by the most efficient firms.  This objective is pursued using two 
mechanisms:  i) cooperatives which fail to accomplish improvement goals lose a 
percentage of their market to ENTEL, and ii) authorization for mergers, acquisitions and 
stock swaps. 
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 Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones, the State monopoly. 
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Table 4: 
Established goals for long distance and local services 
(Percentages are accumulated to the year 2000) 
 
ENTEL: Long distance Service Cooperatives: Local Service 
Failure correction in rented circuits: 90% of failures 
are repaired in 24 hours and 100% in three days in 
rural areas. 
Failure correction in rented circuits: 90% of 
failures are repaired in 24 hours and 90% in three 
days in rural areas. 
Digitalization and network renovation for long 
distance; of secondary connections, of satellite 
connections; 100% of the national commutation 
system; installation of required connections and 
signaling system 7. 
100% substitution of manual and analogical 
equipment by digital or another technology 
75% completion of long distance national calls 
(LDN). 
70% completion of long distance international calls 
(LDI) 
80% answered calls before 10 seconds in LDN 
70% answered calls in 10 seconds in LDI 
1% congestion during 99% of the days of the year 
since 1997 
99.99% of network availability for satellite services 
80% of failures repaired in 24 hours in local 
service 
30% of failures presented during the year 
80% completion of local calls, 75% LDN, 70% 
LDI 
80% complain calls answered before 10 seconds 
2% congestion during 95% of the days of the year 
Tone in less than 5% of intents with more than 3% 
waiting 
Rural area expansion: 100% installation of a 
telephone line in all communities with population 
greater than 350 and less than 10,000. 
Failure correction in rural areas: 100% of failures 
repaired in three days. 
95% of solicitudes attended in 15 days 
100% of population attended in rural areas 
Source: Telecommunications Superintendence  
 
To date, the only modification of this industrial structure has been a joint venture 
between COMTECO (the Cochabamba cooperative) and Western Wireless International 
for the acquisition of a PCS license.  This venture created Nuevatel, which began its 
operations in December 2000.  This has resulted in an intensification of competition in 
the mobile market.  Meanwhile, incumbents and potential entrants are devoting their 
energies to preparing for entry liberalization and the end of exclusive rights. 
 
Water 
 
While the other sectors experienced capitalization and the introduction of 
regulation, the water industry has undergone limited changes and encountered more 
difficulties.  The intended result in this area was the proliferation of concessions (as 
opposed to actual privatizations) for the administration of State assets.  In practice, only 
 14 
one municipal firm, SAMAPA (La Paz/El Alto), was transferred to the private sector in 
1997, for its administration by Aguas del Illimani.
16
 
The expectation was that within a prudent amount of time, legislation would be in 
place to incorporate the remaining firms into a similar model.  However, the long period 
used for the development of the Potable Water and Sewerage Law (finally approved in 
2000), together with significant failure in a second transfer of a municipal firm 
(SEMAPA) to Aguas del Tunari in Cochabamba, has slowed and somewhat redirected 
change in this sector.  Nevertheless, during 1998 and 1999, the Water Superintendence 
was able to incorporate the new regulatory regime and sign concessions with the existing 
municipal water firms in Santa Cruz, Oruro, Sucre, and other smaller cities. 
Under the new model, the concession seeks to improve internal efficiency and 
attain expansion and quality goals.  The characteristics of the Aguas del Illimani contract 
reflect this, and the objectives established for the 1997-2001 period include: i) 100 
percent access to potable water or sewerage (excluding public fountains) in the areas of 
Achachicala and Pampahasi, which cover the city of La Paz, ii) 82 percent access to 
potable water in the city of El Alto by 2001, of which 50 percent should be expansion 
connections, and 41% access to sewerage;  and iii) compliance with the long-term 
expansion goals presented in Table 5. 
 
Table 5 
Expansion goals for potable water and sewage services in La Paz and El Alto
17
  
(Percentage of households) 
 
Zone 2001 2006 2011 2016 2021 2026 
Potable Water 
Achachicala 
Pampahasi 
El Alto 
 
100 
100 
82 
 
100 
100 
85 
 
100 
100 
90 
 
100 
100 
90 
 
100 
100 
90 
 
100 
100 
90 
Sewerage 
Achachicala 
Pampahasi 
El Alto 
 
81 
83 
41 
 
84 
85 
43 
 
90 
90 
47 
 
94 
94 
71 
 
95 
95 
90 
 
95 
95 
90 
Source:  Aguas del Illimani contract.  
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 The main shareholder is Lyonnaise Des Eaux, with 35 percent. 
17
 El Alto was part of the city of La Paz  until the mid 80´s. 
 15 
Quality norms include aspects related to the sources of water, its quality, 
abundance and pressure; continuity of service, infrastructure efficiency, consumer 
attention, and emergencies.  Tariff regulation was established under a rate of return 
mechanism with a five-year regulatory lag.  Prices calculated this way are designed to 
permit the firm to comply with its contractual obligations and the expansion goals.  
Although the lag promotes internal efficiency, no productivity factors where 
incorporated.  Additionally, tariffs were set in dollar terms payable in bolivianos.
18
 
Finally, the following are among the most important characteristics of the new 
Potable Water and Sewerage Law:  i) Responsibility for the provision of these services 
belongs to municipal governments, but can be transferred to Water and Sewerage 
Providers (WSP) which can be private, municipal, or mixed firms, cooperatives, or other 
civil associations recognized by law; ii) The territory is divided into concessionary and 
non-concessionary areas.  The first are financially sustainable and the service is provided 
only by WSP´s, the second are not and the service can be provided by a local 
government; iii) Tariff regulation of WSP´s establishes the use of rate of return criteria, 
investment and efficiency targets, and a five year regulatory lag; and iv) Universal access 
in non-concession areas will be supported by public investment. 
 
IV. The effects on access:  connection and consumption 
 
In most countries, reforms to the utilities sector raise a number of concerns, and 
recently these have included the impact on poor households’ access to basic services.  
This section addresses these issues in two stages: first, it focuses on how access defined 
as connection has evolved during the period following capitalization; it then analyzes 
how changes in pricing policies may have affected the poor. 
 
 A. Data and coverage 
 
 The analysis is based on data from three household surveys carried out by the 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE), as detailed in table 6.  These allow study of the 
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 This clause had to be lifted in December 2000 after pressures from the inhabitants of El Alto. 
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1994-1999 period, during which the major capitalization and regulatory reforms took 
place and had their initial effects.  Additionally, they make feasible simple comparisons 
with 1989-94, a period during which as figure 1 illustrated, the country had a similar 
economic performance, but none of the reforms were yet implemented. 
 
Table 6 
Household surveys used 
 
Data set Year 
collected 
Coverage Sample size 
(households) 
Encuesta Integrada de Hogares, 1
st
 round 1989 Department capitals
1
 3,765 
Encuesta Integrada de Hogares, 7
th
 round 1994 Department capitals
1
 6,102 
Encuesta Continua de Hogares  1999 National 1,325
2 
Note:  1. Includes the country’s nine department capitals (excluding Cobija) and El Alto. 
          2. For comparability, this sample refers only to the department capitals covered in 1989 and 1994. 
 
A drawback with the 1989 and 1994 surveys is that they only cover the major 
urban areas:  eight department capitals and El Alto; so that between-year comparisons 
focus only on these urban centers.  While this certainly limits the analysis, this restriction 
may be appropriate to the extent that capitalization effects should be most visible in this 
realm.  To complement this information, this section also includes rural data based on the 
1999 survey, as well as results from other studies.  A final drawback is that the (relevant) 
sample size for the1999 survey is considerably smaller than the other two; this may 
explain some slightly anomalous results, as described below. 
 
 B. Changes in connection rates 
 
In considering connection rates, this section focuses on access to electricity, 
telephone, and water and sewerage services.  Gas is ignored for three reasons.  First, In 
most cities, gas for domestic consumption is distributed in liquefied, “bottled” form.  
Thus, its use does not imply connection to a network, but rather reflects households’ 
(potentially temporary) decision to use this fuel.  Secondly, even in places where network 
distribution does take place, its coverage is too small to be reliably captured using 
household surveys.  Finally, the emphasis of the capitalization processes in natural gas 
has been expanding exports rather than enhancing domestic distribution. 
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With this caveat, table 7 illustrates the aggregate facts on the evolution of 
connection to basic services in the larger cities.  The precise survey questions used to 
construct these connection rates are featured in the appendix.  In this regard, electricity 
and telephone are the simplest cases, as they are based on the household’s straightforward 
declaration as to whether it has each service.  Sewerage is considered available only if the 
household’s dwelling is connected to the network. 
Finally, we include two definitions in the case of water.  In the first case, the 
household is considered connected if it declares it has a pipe connection either within its 
dwelling or in the building its dwelling is a part of.  In the second case, only the 
households in the first category are considered connected.  As evident, the difference 
between these two is substantial:  coverage is at least twice as large using the first 
definition; in contrast, the improvement between 1994 and 1999 is greater under 
definition (2).  In part, these differences in improvement rates may reflect that the 
wording of the questions used to prepare definition (2) has changed somewhat between 
surveys.  Additionally, accuracy in the case of criterion (2) relies on survey 
administrators and respondents making somewhat subtle distinctions as to the nature of 
water connections.  In light of this, and since this paper focuses on changes in connection 
rates, in the remainder we focus only on definition (1), but note it may overstate coverage 
levels. 
 
Table 7 
Departmental capitals and El Alto: 
Percentage of households connected to basic services, 1994-1999 
 
Service Percentage of households with access 
1994 
(a) 
1999 
(b) 
% change 
 
Electricity 96.0 98.8 2.9 
Telephone 20.6 42.5 106.3 
Water (1) 80.7 92.0 14.0 
Water (2) 26.7 42.1 57.6 
Sewerage 47.3 57.4 21.4 
                             Source:  Authors’ calculations using the surveys listed in table 6. 
                             Note:  The precise questions used to determine access definitions are 
                                         detailed in the appendix. 
 
Table 7 illustrates that, as might be expected in light of the investment record, 
basic access increased for all services considered.  Furthermore, for those with initially 
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lower coverage, sewerage, water, and particularly telephone, the increases have been 
significant.  Importantly, the observed expansions took place in the context of one of the 
more rapid urbanization processes in Latin America.
19
  This puts pressure on cities’ 
infrastructure because of the inflow of rural migrants who, on average, have lower 
incomes than urban residents.  In other words, in the absence of adequate investment, 
coverage rates would have probably declined during these years. 
 
C. Are these changes actually due to utility sector reforms? 
 
While table 7 suggests that the reforms described in section III have been 
associated with an expansion in access, it does not necessarily imply that these caused 
this phenomenon.  Indeed, other factors such as income growth or technological change 
might have resulted in connection improvements even in the absence of any 
liberalization. 
In a strict sense, it is impossible to isolate the effects these measures had, since no 
perfect counterfactual is available to assess what would have happened had none of the 
measures been in place.  If this information were available, a simple comparison would 
reveal the effects of the reform “treatment”; in its absence, simple conclusions are not 
feasible.  Nonetheless, one can attempt to circumvent this problem by comparing 
“treatment” and “control” sectors or periods.  This section presents two exercises that 
attempt this. 
A first possibility is to observe the changes in access prior to the reform period, 
comparing them to those that occurred thereafter.  To implement this, figure 2 displays 
access rates for 1989, 1994, and 1999 for each of the sectors considered.
20
  In this case, 
the 1989-94 period serves as “control” for the 1994-99 capitalization years.  This 
comparison is enhanced because as suggested by figure 1, relatively low inflation, 
moderate growth, and relative political stability prevailed during both periods. 
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 Between the 1976 and 1992 censuses, the urbanization rate increased from 42 to 58 percent. 
20
 The 1989 survey does not contain a direct question on telephone access, so households were considered 
connected when they declared positive expenditures on telephone service.  Using the same approach in 
subsequent years does not qualitatively affect the conclusions that flow from Figure 1. 
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 This simple evidence is generally suggestive of a positive effect in the cases of 
sewerage, telephone, and water services.  The access rates in these sectors were either 
“flat” or decreasing between 1989 and 1994, but display significant increases after this 
last year.  In the case of electricity, in contrast, the entire 1989-99 period suggests gradual 
growth in access rates, with no particular acceleration taking place during the second 
phase.  In fact, figure 2 may actually underestimate a “capitalization effect”.  This is 
because while the legal reforms underpinning capitalization began to take effect in 1994 
and 1995, the actual investments, depending on the specific sector, did not start until 
1996, 1997, or even 1998, as suggested in table 3. 
In the case of telephone service, these issues are observed using conventional 
penetration data, as presented in figure 3.  This allows, further, a distinction between 
fixed line and cellular connections, which is not possible with the household survey data.  
This figure also displays stagnant performance early on, with a break in 1995/1996.  
From this year on, mobile telephone coverage has increased rapidly, and although fixed 
connections have been less dynamic, the overall penetration rate essentially tripled in 
four years. 
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 It bears repeating that the effects observed cannot be attributed only to 
capitalization.  As described in section III, other relevant changes include the 
implementation of regulation in all these sectors, but also other liberalizations like the 
introduction of competition in cellular (in relation to figure 3), and concessions in the 
case of water and sewerage.  Some of these factors are discussed further in the next 
section. 
Meanwhile, another way to attempt to isolate these reforms’ impact is to compare 
cities in which they would be expected to have more consequences with those in which 
they might have had less of an effect.  In the case of water and sewerage services, La 
Paz/El Alto was the only city with a sustained concession. Figure 4 presents the evidence 
on this case, where the expectation would be that increases in access would be larger in 
these than in other urban centers. 
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 In both cases, there are no major differences between the evolution of La Paz / El 
Alto and other urban areas.  For water, coverage in these areas appears to have converged 
over this period, and in some cases differences are not statistically significant.  In the case 
of sewerage, after 1994 coverage appears to have risen somewhat faster in La Paz / El 
Alto than in all other major urban areas (taken together).  In short, the evidence in these 
sectors is inconclusive, but does not seem to suggest a strong capitalization / privatization 
effect.  In the cases of electricity and telephone services, the distinction between the 
“treatment” and “control” urban centers is not always clear, and is omitted here for 
reasons of space. 
In the end, none of these comparisons is conclusive, since in all cases it is simple 
to think of concurrent events or trends that might confuse the interpretation.  
Nevertheless, taken together and combined with the investment levels cited, they lend 
support to the widespread perception that the capitalization processes did contribute to an 
expansion of access to basic services. 
Before moving to whether these changes bypassed the poor, it is relevant to note 
that the information presented gives a relatively optimistic picture of connection rates in 
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Bolivia.  To a large extent, this reflects that due to data limitations, the analysis 
concentrates only on department capitals.
21
  This overstates national welfare levels 
because other urban areas, and the rural area in general, display lower connection rates.  
This is illustrated in figure 5, which shows access rates in departmental capitals, other  
 
urban areas, and rural locations. The significant differences between areas reflect, among 
other factors, substantial variation in income levels and population densities. 
 
 D. Did the expansion in access bypass or benefit the poor? 
 
The aggregate changes reviewed thus far are consistent with a number of 
scenarios as to the distribution of the gains depicted.  Specifically, they are not 
informative as to what changes in access poor households experienced.  As stated above, 
the capitalization reforms have mainly affected the department capitals.  This fact, 
combined with the information contained in table 1 suggests that a first approximation 
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answer to the question “have these expansions bypassed the poor?” is simply, “yes”.  
This is a consequence of two facts:  capitalization had relatively few effects on the rural 
area, and clearly a majority of the poor population is concentrated there. 
Ajwad and Wodon (2000) make this point indirectly and formally, by studying to 
what extent poor municipalities (of which there are roughly 300 in total) benefit from 
expansions in education, health or infrastructure services.  They conclude that in 
sewerage, electricity, and phone connections, the non-poor clearly benefit more, water 
being the only exception.  In short, if the entire capitalization process did lead to some 
increase in access rates, it is unlikely to have been particularly beneficial to the poor, at 
least from a national perspective. 
Nevertheless, it is still relevant to explore whether access expansions bypassed the 
poor in the urban area, since that would seem the real (and perhaps more reasonable) test 
as to the equity side of the capitalization process (as opposed to more general 
infrastructure investment).  Furthermore, the low coverage rates in the rural areas reflect 
inequity but also economic rationality:  providing these services can be extremely 
expensive when population density is below some threshold level.  To this end, the 
following figures compare how households have fared according to the (department 
capital) quintiles to which they belong, where these are calculated using households per 
capita labor income.
22
. It might well have been desirable to construct these quintiles 
using consumption or a more complete definition of income, for instance, one that 
included transfers and asset-related payments.  This was not done mainly because the 
questions necessary to construct such measures change between the different surveys 
considered. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
on the trends. 
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 It might be desirable to construct these quintiles using consumption or a more complete definition of 
income, for instance, one that included transfers and asset-related payments.  This was not done mainly 
because the questions necessary to construct such measures change between the different surveys 
considered. 
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Figure 6 starts with the case of electricity, which has been the sector with the 
smallest improvements in access, partially reflecting relatively favorable initial 
conditions.  The figure displays a clear “convergence”:  the quintiles with the lowest 
access levels in 1989 have been those with the greatest increases during 1989-99, an 
observation which also holds for the 1994-99 time frame.  While in 1989 households in 
the lowest quintile had an access rate of only 86 percent, by 1994 all five had rates 
exceeding 95 percent.  It is surprising that by 1999 the lowest income group seems in fact 
to have surpassed all but the richest.  In part, this may reflect sampling issues, since when 
all groups have high and similar access rates, these differences can cease to be 
statistically significant; additionally, 1999 is the year with the smallest sample. 
Taking a similar approach, figure 7 reviews the urban areas’ experience with 
telephone access.  The evolution here has been somewhat different from that observed in 
the case of electricity.  As reviewed earlier, between 1989 and 1994 (the pre-
capitalization period) access rates were essentially flat.  Figure 7 reveals that this 
aggregate behavior in fact hides an increase in access for the highest income quintiles, 
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and declines in connection for the lower income households, where once again, this could 
reflect that many rural migrants enter the cities at the bottom of the income distribution. 
 
Figure 7 also shows, however, that these trends changed significantly after 
capitalization.  Namely, between 1994 and 1999 access rates increased significantly for 
all income groups.  The relative gap between the two or three bottom quintiles and the 
richest has decreased, even if the absolute difference in percentage points has remained 
fairly constant.  In short, this simple evidence suggests that in the case of telephone 
access, liberalization has not merely included the poor, but may have actually reversed 
trends that were detrimental to them. 
Moving onto the case of water, figure 8 shows an evolution not unlike that 
displayed by telephone services. Once again, access rates are relatively stable in the 
control period, but increase between 1994 and 1999.  The “convergence” in connection 
rates is more marked:  by 1999 households in all quintiles have access rates above 90 
percent, and the differences between them are often not statistically significant.
23
  It bears 
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 It might seem surprising that access rates are not closer to 100 percent for the top quintiles.  While this 
may reflect data problems, there are “good” reasons for it.  In the largest cities, for instance, high income 
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repeating that while these connection rates may seem rather high, this in part reflects the 
definition of access used, as detailed in the discussion surrounding table 7. 
 
 Finally, figure 9 shows the evolution of access to sewerage.  In this case the 
information is less consistent.  A surprising observation is that some surveys suggest that 
the situation of the lowest income quintile is better than that displayed by quintile 2 or 
even 3.  This may reflect measurement problems, and results in this realm must be 
viewed with caution. 
To summarize, despite data limitations, the household survey data suggests that 
the capitalization/regulation reforms, to the extent that they caused increases in 
connection rates, have not bypassed poor households, and have in some cases tended to 
benefit poor households disproportionately.  This has been particularly the case for phone 
services, where competition has made this service much more accessible, and reversed 
trends of increasing inequality. 
                                                                                                                                                 
developments are sometimes built outside the reach of water networks.  These households use truck-
delivered water, and despite having all the standard facilities, will not be counted as connected. 
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E. Access as affordability:  prices and expenditure 
 
 The previous section has concentrated on access as connection.  As Foster (1999) 
and Waddams Price and Hancock (1998) review, however, there are a number of other 
price-related channels through which a process like capitalization could have adversely 
affected the poor.  These include that as a consequence of such reforms: 
1) Average tariff levels can increase due to cost recovery requirements and the 
need to finance quality improvements.  This section shows that while average prices 
increased in some sectors, changes were generally not dramatic.  In part, this reflects that 
because capitalization was not a means to raise deficit finance, there were fewer 
incentives for the State to build high tariffs into privatization.  The concurrent 
implementation of a regulatory framework, and the promotion of competition may have 
also helped to keep price increases in check. 
2) Tariff structures may be readjusted as direct or cross-subsidies disappear, 
either as an explicit policy or as a consequence of market forces.  Waddams Price and 
Hancock (1998) empirically illustrate this for the United Kingdom.  Although the data 
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below suggest some rebalancing did take place, there are reasons to believe that in 
Bolivia, the incentives to rebalance were not as strong.  First, some firms affected by the 
reforms were private already (e.g. COBEE in electricity).  Second, where they were not 
private, utilities often functioned as cooperatives.  While these are not typical firms, they 
do not have the same distributional goals as State enterprises, so these were not there to 
“abandon” after the reforms.  Finally, the vertical separation that some industries 
displayed before privatization may have meant that cross subsidies were less prevalent 
than in other countries.  For instance, it is not uncommon for high long distance rates to 
subsidize low local charges.  In Bolivia, the long distance state provider, ENTEL, was 
always separate from the local cooperatives 
3) As the industry becomes more “formal”, revenue collection and 
discouragement of illegal connections are likely to result in price increases.  Once again, 
the existence of private firms or cooperatives may have meant that there was not as much 
room for improvement in this regard. 
4) Privatization may affect the availability and prices of substitutes or 
complements. 
Making an effort to deal with significant data limitations, this section looks at these 
issues in the case of electricity, water, and telephone services. 
 
 Electricity 
 
 Figure 10 presents the evolution of minimum electricity tariffs, up to 20 
Kwh/month, in the three largest cities (for completeness, it includes data from 1992, 
while the reforms commenced in 1994).  Although these are not average tariffs, they are 
likely to be most relevant for poor households.  As evident, rates in Cochabamba have 
decreased by about 14 percent since capitalization.  In contrast, prices have gone up by 
15 percent in Santa Cruz, and by roughly 7 in La Paz/El Alto. 
 29 
 
Regarding rebalancing, distribution is still carried out by local monopolies that 
may experience fewer pressures to engage in this behavior.  To explore this issue and 
provide further evidence on average prices, table 8 shows the mean tariffs in cents per 
Kwh for the three largest distributors, distinguishing according to the type of customer.  
As the table shows, both the pre and post capitalization periods have been characterized 
by overall real price increases for the residential sector.  Nevertheless, this trend seems to 
be reversing, with price decreases (or zero increases) visible in Cochabamba and Santa 
Cruz by 1998, a behavior consistent with that displayed by minimum prices in figure 10. 
The last six columns explore the issue of rebalancing.  Although the classification 
of customers varies between cities, the data suggest the residential sector has seen greater 
increases, but the differences do not always go in this direction and generally do not seem 
large. 
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Table 8 
Residential rates for electric distributors in La Paz / El Alto, Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz 
 
Year Tariff rates Percentage change in the 
residential sector 
Percentage change in all 
sectors 
Electropaz 
(La Paz / El 
Alto) 
Elfec 
(Cbba.) 
CRE 
(Santa 
Cruz) 
Electropaz Elfec CRE Electropaz Elfec CRE 
1992 3.96 5.62 4.45 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
1993 4.30 5.52 4.47 8.6 -1.8 0.0 9.8 -0.6 1.4 
1994 4.60 5.66 4.56 7.0 2.5 2.0 5.3 1.2 1.8 
1995 4.89 6.04 4.86 6.3 6.7 6.6 5.2 5.4 5.9 
1996 5.04 6.25 5.45 4.2 3.5 12.1 2.9 1.9 6.8 
1997 5.34 6.31 5.71 5.9 0.9 4.8 6.3 2.6 4.4 
1998 5.74 6.65 5.71 7.5 5.4 0.0 7.4 3.4 -0.4 
1999 6.08 6.45 5.52 5.9 -3.0 -3.3 5.4 -1.6 -1.9 
 
Water 
 
As stated, in the case of water “privatization” was really a concession, and only 
affected La Paz/El Alto.  Up to 1996, the state-owned SAMAPA operated with a 
complicated tariff structure that contained more than 150 categories, 15 for metered 
customers and 135 for the rest.  Under this arrangement, consumers were not charged for 
the first 10m
3
, and a study from the time suggests the mean tariff was approximately $US 
0.32/m
3
. 
 In December of 1996, the National Council of Tariffs voted to amend and 
simplify this arrangement.  This policy was intended to become effective on December 
1996, but in practice was implemented by Aguas del Illimani in May, 1997, along with a 
19 percent increase it was granted upon taking over.  The prevailing tariff structure is 
displayed in table 9. 
 
Table 9 
Tariff structures for SAMAPA and Aguas del Illimani 
 
Type of consumer (m
3
 / month) Tariff ($US/m
3
) Percentage 
change Domestic Commercial Industrial SAMAPA Aguas del 
Illimani 
1 to 30   0.1850 0.2214 19.7 
31 to 150   0.3719 0.4428 19.1 
151 to 300 1 to 20  0.5579 0.6642 19.0 
301 or more 21 or more 1 or more 0.9964 1.1862 19.0 
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While this arrangement is relatively progressive, clearly the customers that 
benefited from the “free” 10m3 would have been hurt.  Nevertheless, cross subsidies 
persist, and while the concession did result in higher tariffs, the increases are smaller than 
those in Santa Cruz, where no such reform took place.  This is illustrated in figure 11.
24
 
 
Telephone services 
 
As indicated above, coverage expansions have been greatest in the case of 
telephones, so one might expect significant price reductions in this case. These partially 
reflect technological innovation and the effects of competition, which as in other 
countries seems to have allowed privatization to create rather than destroy service 
alternatives.  In Bolivia, this happened because prior to reform Telecel had a (private) 
monopoly in cellular services, and there is evidence that it priced accordingly.  Figures 12 
and 13 show the dollar price for the standard service offered from the early 1990’s to 
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 Cochabamba actually experienced a decline in real tariffs during the reform period, a development not 
unrelated to the fact that concession was a failure in this city. 
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October 1996.  The fixed monthly tariff of 29.9 dollars did not include free minutes, and 
the tariff per minute was 0.41, covering both incoming and outgoing calls.  Additionally, 
Telecel charged 417 dollars for the initial connection.  The entrance of capitalized 
ENTEL’s subsidiary ENTEL-Movil, permitted the reductions observed.  Competition 
was so effective that although the regulator set a price cap of $US 180 for access and 
$US 51 for use, both firms began charging average rates that were roughly five percent of 
this level. 
 
Figures 12 and 13 are based on ENTEL’s  “Family Plan” and Telecel’s “Economy 
Plan”.  Under these connection fees for digital lines are free, the monthly fixed tariff 
without free minutes dropped to 1.93 dollars in November 1996, and the tariff per minute 
increased to 0.45.  While in the first period tariffs where set in dollars, in the second 
period they were set in bolivianos, becoming subject to currency depreciation.  By 
December 1999, the dollar value of the fixed tariff dropped to 1.67 and of the per minute 
tariff dropped to 0.39.  Simultaneously, both ENTEL and Telecel introduced a variety of 
other plans and prepayment mechanisms, with the latter contributing to further 
penetration. 
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These price reductions, combined with the availability of low cost cellular phones 
dramatically lowered access prices, particularly compared to the historical performance 
of the local telephone cooperatives, which charge prices in excess 1,000 dollars for a 
fixed connection/share.  As all these markets will be liberalized in 2001, and as the first 
PCS operator entered the market at the end of 2000, these trends are expected to continue 
if not intensify. 
 Combining evidence for all these sectors, table 10 shows the average expenditure 
levels (in dollars) on water, electricity and telephone services for the different income 
quintiles.  While all have increased in real terms, there seems to be no consistent pattern 
on how these increases have been distributed across income groups.  The next section 
explores this using standard welfare measures. 
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Table 10 
Expenditures on basic services by income quintiles, 1994-1999 
 
 1994 expenditure 
(dollars) 
1999 expenditure 
(dollars) 
1994-1999  
(% change) 
Water Elec. Teleph. Water Elec. Teleph. Water Elec. Teleph. 
1 2.9 6.1 7.9 4.5 8.8 11.6 52.9 44.5 47.9 
2 3.4 6.7 9.0 5.5 10.1 14.0 62.4 49.5 56.5 
3 3.8 7.7 9.0 6.7 12.4 14.5 75.0 61.7 61.2 
4 4.5 9.3 12.2 7.6 13.3 17.5 69.6 42.9 43.1 
5 7.0 14.1 20.0 11.1 20.3 30.7 58.3 43.5 53.3 
Total 4.4 8.8 13.6 7.1 12.8 19.0 62.3 45.5 39.9 
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
 
V. The distributional impact of tariff structure changes 
 
As suggested earlier, price changes may have affected different income groups 
differentially.  Unfortunately, data limitations make getting a handle on this issue difficult 
in Bolivia.  As Estache et al. (2000) point out, to assess the impact of rebalancing one 
needs:  i) household level observations on a range of socioeconomic variables, ii) data on 
expenditure and physical consumption of utility services; and iii) information on 
households which are not connected or are informally connected. 
Unfortunately, these requirements are not met with the surveys at hand, which 
have several of the disadvantages discussed by Gomez-Lobo, Foster, and Halpern (1999).  
The central problem is that they do not record the quantity of electricity, water, or 
telephone services consumed.  Specifically, in the cases of electricity and water, 
assessing the effects of price changes, as Waddams Price and Hancock (1998) do for the 
UK, would require knowledge of which tariff rate each household paid each year.  This is 
difficult to determine without knowledge of the quantities consumed, particularly with 
the sometimes intricate tariff structures prevalent before reform.  In the case of telephone 
services, this issue is even more severe, since it is impossible to differentiate between 
expenditures on fixed line and mobile phone services. 
Despite these difficulties, this section makes some assumptions to implement the 
methodology used by Waddams Price and Hancock.  This approach is summarized in the 
expression 
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W = x* (p1 – p2) 
where W is the change in consumer welfare; p1 and p2 are the average prices in periods 
1 and 2, respectively, and x* is average consumption estimated from expenditure and 
tariffs; a number between x1 and x2 (with x1 > x2 when p2 > p1). 
A limitation is that this methodology does not take into account changes in access, 
and while this may well not be a problem for the UK, it clearly matters in Bolivia.  As a 
result, for the Bolivian case x* is average consumption between x1 and x2, which biases 
the measure of welfare change.  Additionally, lack of information on average prices and 
use of available minimum tariffs instead may cause an underestimate.  Given these 
restrictions, the results must be taken as an approximation, but hopefully remain 
informative as to the distribution of welfare changes over quintiles and regions.
25
 
Table 11 shows that in general, larger absolute losses are observed in Santa Cruz, 
while Cochabamba presents some welfare gains.  From a distributional perspective, the 
absolute losses of the richest quintile are roughly two or three times that of the poorest.  
As the last row which describes relative average incomes makes clear, the impact relative 
to household income was clearly more adverse for poorer households, and the reforms 
appear regressive in this sense. 
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 There are methodologies to correct for the bias this may cause, see for instance Wollack (1996).  
However, some of the data requirements they pose also created problems in the Bolivian context.  Instead 
of going down a path of ever more complicated assumptions, we decided to stay with the simpler results 
and advice they be interpreted with caution.  In any case and as should be clear from the earlier sections, 
access rather than price changes are the main story in Bolivia. 
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Table 11 
Average monthly variation of consumer surplus quintiles, 1994-1999 
(in Dollars) 
 
Location Total Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
LaPaz/ElAlto-LP/EA 
Water 
Electricity 
Bottled gas 
Total gain 
 
-0.68 
-1.39 
-0.06 
-2.13 
 
-0.47 
-0.93 
-0.06 
-1.46 
 
-0.45 
-0.97 
-0.06 
-1.48 
 
-0.58 
-1.25 
-0.06 
-1.89 
 
-0.62 
-1.31 
-0.06 
-1.99 
 
-1.23 
-2.49 
-0.06 
-3.78 
Cochabamba-CBBA 
Water 
Electricity 
Bottled gas 
Total gain 
 
0.34 
1.52 
-0.07 
1.80 
 
0.26 
1.21 
-0.06 
1.41 
 
0.27 
1.40 
-0.07 
1.60 
 
0.34 
1.39 
-0.07 
1.66 
 
0.33 
1.57 
-0.07 
1.84 
 
0.50 
2.21 
-0.07 
2.63 
Santa Cruz-SCZ 
Water 
Electricity 
Bottled gas 
Total gain 
 
-5.68 
-1.18 
-0.06 
-6.93 
 
-4.06 
-0.93 
-0.06 
-5.05 
 
-6.03 
-0.97 
-0.07 
-7.07 
 
-4.56 
-1.00 
-0.06 
-5.62 
 
-5.15 
-1.15 
-0.06 
-6.36 
 
-7.09 
-1.48 
-0.07 
-8.63 
LP/EA-CBBA-SCZ 
Water 
Electricity 
Bottled gas 
Total gain 
 
-2.05 
-0.54 
-0.06 
-2.65 
 
-1.23 
-0.35 
-0.06 
-1.64 
 
-1.57 
-0.40 
-0.06 
-2.03 
 
-1.80 
-0.48 
-0.06 
-2.34 
 
-2.09 
-0.55 
-0.06 
-2.71 
 
-3.19 
-0.83 
-0.07 
-4.09 
Average income 
relative to that of 
quintile 1 
443 100 212 303 497 1104 
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
 
VI. Macroeconomic impact 
 
Moving beyond the direct effects on consumers, it is relevant to note 
capitalization also had significant impacts on macroeconomic variables, and is part of a 
broader transformation in the Bolivian economy.  The most visible is the increase in 
foreign direct investment (FDI) since 1994, partly explained by the capitalized firms’ 
activities, as shown in figure 14.  In the external sector, this had the effect of 
strengthening the balance of payments accounts and enhancing their sustainability.  The 
resilience of total FDI to the downturn that began in 1999 (see figure 1) is an important 
factor in explaining why the recession in Bolivia was less severe than that in some 
neighboring countries.
26
 
                                                 
26
 Preliminary data suggests GDP growth began a slow recovery in the year 2000. 
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In the national accounts FDI helped raised investment from 13.5 percent of GDP 
in 1994 to 19.8 in 1999 (see Figure 15).  This investment concentrated in several sectors:  
oil and natural gas, electricity, bottled gas and oil derivatives, telecommunications and 
transportation.  As one would expect, these sectors gained importance relative to more 
“traditional” activities like mining. 
Furthermore, the decision to capitalize State firms was considered a “second 
generation” part of the reforms initiated in 1985, with the usual objective of leaving the 
private sector in charge of productive activities, in an environment of open markets and 
competition.  The State remained responsible for regulating, administering the law, 
ensuring macroeconomic stability, and investing in social sectors; all of these in an 
environment of decentralization and greater local participation. 
 38 
 
 
Figure 16 shows how the composition of public investment gradually came to 
reflect these priorities.  Although total investment increased by only 3.4 percent, the 
social sectors’ participation went up from 25 percent in 1994 to 50 in 1999.  Investment 
in production also increased from 8.1 to 15.4 percent, largely greater support of the 
agricultural sector.  However, investment in production of extractives decreased from 
21.1 percent in 1994 to 1.3 in 1999, mainly due to withdrawal from hydrocarbons 
production.  The decline in infrastructure from 45.7 to 33.5 percent partially reflects 
withdrawal from the electricity, telecommunications, and transportation sectors.  At the 
same time, there was a sustained decrease of government’s participation in GDP. 
Figure 15
M ain m acroeconom ic variables as percent of G D P
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Capitalization also had an impact on the government’s budget deficit.  While in 
1990 the (before pensions) deficit was 4.4 percent of GDP, by 1994 it decreased to 1.8 
and by 1999 the government experienced a surplus of 0.2%.  A first increase in 
government income in 1994 and a second increase in 1998 contributed in closing the gap.  
However, due to pension reform the budget deficit increased again from 1997 on, 
reaching 3.9% of GDP in 1999.   
Figure 17 shows that the increase in government income occurred mainly in tax 
collection and due to a new hydrocarbons tax, while income from the sales of 
hydrocarbons and its derivatives and sales from other government firms decreased 
substantially from 1995 on, due to reform.  Additionally, the regulated sectors (crude oil, 
natural gas, oil derivatives, electricity, bottled gas, communications and transportation) 
became first in tax contributions after 1995. 
To summarize, the capitalization reforms were part of a broader restructuring of 
the economy that in all likelihood had multiple indirect effects on poor households.  One 
highlight in this process is the increased importance of the social components in public 
expenditure, as aspect it seems to have helped bring about.  In the long run, this might be 
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more beneficial to the poor than continued investment in sometimes inefficient State-
controlled productive sectors. 
 
VII. Regulatory challenges 
 
Since its inception in the mid-1990's the regulatory system has confronted several 
challenges.  Its consolidation has been affected by the length of time each 
superintendence has been in existence, its financial resources, its relationship with the 
government, the availability of trained personnel, and other sector-specific 
characteristics.  Restrictions to regulatory activity have been observed in the relationship 
of the system with firms, consumers, the government, and in the relations between the 
general and sectoral superintendeces. 
In the first case, the main source of conflict has been the lack of sectoral laws in 
the case of transportation and water.  In electricity, telecommunications and 
hydrocarbons, further legal development is necessary, particularly in relation to antitrust 
issues.  A permanent difficult has also been the expected information asymmetry:  firms 
Figure 17
G overnm ent incom e as percent of G D P
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have better knowledge than the regulator in key areas like operation costs, demand 
conditions, investment valuation, and service quality. 
Relations with consumers have progressed as they have come to understand their 
rights and obligations, as well as the complaint procedures channeled through consumers' 
defense offices (which  handled more than 140 thousand cases during 1998 alone).  
Despite this activity, it seems the system can do more for consumers by aggressively 
promoting competition, and by introducing productivity-related incentives in some 
sectors.  Further, antitrust regulation is under consideration in an economy-wide basis. 
As far as relations between the regulatory system and the government, conflicts 
arise because in some cases the latter's decisions are taken without full consideration of 
the technical expertise accumulated by the Superintendences.  In others, norms 
introduced or proposed by the government, are in conflict with existing ones, creating 
uncertainty and regulatory risk.  Further, in some cases direct communications between 
the government and current (or potential) operators weaken the system and its credibility. 
Finally, there is the issue of the General Superintendence's task of evaluating the 
sectoral ones, which requires the development of efficiency and efficacy indicators.  This 
has been a challenging task, mainly because it necessitates large amount of information 
and sometimes involves significant time lags.  Additionally, the general superintendence 
has continued in its role as a second instance for appeals, the legal system being the final 
recourse.  The activity in this area, up to the end of 1998, is reviewed in Table 12. 
 
Table 12 
Accumulated appeals with resolution until 1998 
 
Regulated sectors First instance appeals Second instance appeals 
Hydrocarbons 
Electricity 
Telecommunications 
Transportation 
Water 
Total 
12 
23 
78 
5 
8 
126 
6 
8 
21 
2 
3 
40 
Source:  General Superintendence. 
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VIII. Conclusions 
 
For the past 15 years, Bolivia has undergone sustained economic liberalization.  
In the past five, this process has finally reached the utilities sector, where it has brought 
about extensive industrial reorganization, privatization/capitalization, and regulation.  
This paper has presented an initial exploration of how these processes have directly and 
indirectly affected the poor, as well as how they continue to play out and influence the 
economy. 
Out of this review the following conclusions emerge with relative clarity:  i) 
Capitalization was effective in attracting foreign investment, and has had significant and 
generally beneficial macroeconomic effects. ii) It seems to have contributed to increased 
connection rates in the urban area, reversing declines observed at least in the early 1990's. 
iii) In this realm, improvements have not bypassed the poor, and in fact seem to have 
been particularly beneficial to them in some cases. 
As for the equity implications of pricing policy changes, the evidence is less clear, 
in part due to data restrictions.  While there does seem to be evidence of average price 
increases and rebalancing with regressive effects, their magnitude is not that large, 
particularly when compared to the large welfare gains that must have been induced by 
increased connection.  Finally, further strengthening of the regulatory system is probably 
desirable to guarantee further benefits for the poor and consumers more generally. 
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Appendix 
 
Questions for 1994 
 
Service Type of 
access 
Question in the survey Possible answers Coding 
Water  Connection How does you household 
supply itself with water?  
Public or private network: 
1. Inside your dwelling 
2. Outside your dwelling but 
within the house or building 
that the dwelling is part of. 
3. Outside the dwelling, 
outside the house or building 
(public faucet). 
4. Delivery truck 
5. Well 
6. River, lake or spring 
7. Other 
Definition (1): 
The household is 
connected if 
responses 1 or 2 
were given, and 
not connected 
otherwise. 
 
Definition (2):  
The household is 
connected only if 
answer 1 is given 
Consump-
tion 
How much do you pay for 
this each month? 
Amount in bolivianos [Same] 
Electri-
city 
Connection Does you household have 
access to electricity 
Yes or no [Same] 
Consump-
tion 
How much do you pay for 
this each month? 
Amount in bolivianos [Same] 
Tele-
phone 
Connection 
 
Household equipment:  
Does your household have a 
phone connection? 
Yes or no [Same] 
Consump-
tion 
In the last month, how much 
did you or any of the 
members of your 
households spend on 
communications (phone, 
mail services) 
Amount in bolivianos [Same] 
Gas Use What type of fuel do you 
use to cook 
1. Firewood 
2. Animal by-products 
3. Coal 
4. Kerosene 
5. Bottled, liquefied gas 
6. Electricity 
7. Network-supplied natural 
gas 
8. Other 
9. We do not cook 
 
 Con-
sumption 
How much did you, or any 
of the members of your 
household spend on cooking 
fuel (liquefied gas, 
kerosene, other) 
Amount in bolivianos Expenditures on 
gas were 
calculated for 
households that 
declare using it. 
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Questions for 1999 
 
Service Type of 
access 
Question in the survey Possible answers Coding 
Water  Connection What is the origin of the 
drinking and cooking water 
the household uses? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In your dwelling, how is the 
water used to drink and 
cook distributed? 
1. Network that reaches the 
building 
2. Public faucet 
3. Well without a pump 
4. Well with a pump 
5. River or spring 
6. Lake 
7. Delivery truck 
8. Other 
 
1. Pipe within the dwellling 
2. Pipe outside the dwelling 
but within our land 
3. No piped water 
Definition (1) 
The household is 
connected if 
response 1 was 
given for the first 
question, and not 
otherwise. 
 
 
Definition (2):  
The household is 
connected only if 
answer 1 is given 
for both 
questions 
Consump-
tion 
In the last month, how much 
did you pay for potable 
water 
Amount in bolivianos [Same] 
Electri-
city 
Connection Does you use electricity to 
illuminate your dwelling? 
Yes or no [Same] 
Consump-
tion 
In the last month, how much 
did you spend on electric 
service? 
Amount in bolivianos [Same] 
Tele-
phone 
Connection 
 
Does your household have a 
fixed or cellular phone 
connection? 
Yes or no [Same] 
Consump-
tion 
In the last month, how much 
did you spend on fixed or 
cellular phone service? 
Amount in bolivianos [Same] 
Gas Use What type of fuel do you 
use to cook 
1. Firewood 
2. Animal by-products 
3. Kerosene 
4. Bottled, liquefied gas 
5. Network-supplied natural 
gas 
6. Other 
7. Electricity 
8. We do not cook 
 
 Con-
sumption 
In the last month, how much 
did you spend on cooking 
fuel? 
Amount in bolivianos Expenditures on 
gas were 
calculated for 
households that 
declare using it. 
 
